We initiate the study of broadcast steganography (BS), an extension of steganography to the multi-recipient setting. BS enables a sender to communicate covertly with a dynamically designated set of receivers, so that the recipients recover the original content, while unauthorized users and outsiders remain unaware of the covert communication. One of our main technical contributions is the introduction of a new variant of anonymous broadcast encryption that we term outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts (oABE$). Our oABE$ construction achieves sublinear ciphertext size and is secure in the standard model. Besides being of interest in its own right, oABE$ enables an efficient construction of BS secure in the standard model against adaptive adversaries with sublinear communication complexity.
: Comparison of the parameters of (outsider) anonymous broadcast encryption schemes. Each scheme is CCA-secure and requires only one decryption attempt. Only our scheme provides pseudorandom ciphertexts (c ≈ $:Yes). functionality to have pseudorandom ciphertexts. This property so far had not been considered in the broadcast encryption literature, and none of the existing constructions support it natively. Interestingly, attaining pseudorandom ciphertexts requires implicitly that the identities of the recipients be unintelligible in the view of outsiders (pseudorandomness of the ciphertext clearly cannot hold in the view of the recipients). This condition ties back directly to the previous issue, but in a weaker form, as recipient anonymity is only required to hold against outsiders. As it turns out, Fazio and Perera [19] recently proposed a relaxation of full anonymity of exactly this sort: outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption (oABE). This notion trades some degree of anonymity for better efficiency: whereas all known fully-anonymous broadcast encryption schemes [5, 35] have ciphertexts linear in the number of receivers, the constructions of [19] obtain sublinear ciphertext length, though they do not necessarily guarantee that authorized users will learn no information about other members of the receiver set.
In light of the above observations, we put forth and realize (Sect. 4) a new broadcast encryption variant that we term outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts (oABE$). oABE$ enables a black-box construction of BS (cf. Sect. 5). Realizing an efficient oABE$ scheme requires non-trivial enhancements to the oABE construction of [19] , for it entails resolving the apparent tension between our ciphertext pseudorandom property and the ciphertext redundancy introduced by common approaches to CCA security [8, 18] . Our solution harmonizes these requirements using a novel Pedersen-like encapsulation mechanism discussed in Sect. 4.2. A comparison of our oABE$ construction with existing ones is reported in Table 1 , whereas Fig. 1 shows how oABE$ relates to other anonymous broadcast communication tools.
Applications. The combination of stealth and revocation capabilities offered by broadcast steganography enables defenses against insider threats in anti-censorship systems, intelligence scenarios, and other domains that rely on covert communication [37, 42] .
For a military example, consider a camp where each soldier has an army smartphone, on which they receive weather forecast, unclassified news and other information in the clear. Suppose that headquarters suspect that a group of officials are conspiring to commit treachery, and decides to carry out an undercover investigation to confirm the identities of the traitors. Conventional broadcast encryption does not suffice to protect the transmission channel to the soldiers involved in the investigation of the traitors, because the selective exclusion of the conspirators from the communication would already put them on notice. Broadcast steganography, instead, would allow delivery of instructions to the investigating parties without risking alerting the traitors to the investigation.
For a civil rights scenario, an activist/blogger may want to hide her commentary into innocent- The parameters of our black-box broadcast steganography schemes. Type-1 channels are the most general, and are modeled as stateful probabilistic oracles whose output distribution may depend on past samples. Type-2 channels are slightly more restrictive as they assume history independence, and can then be modeled as efficiently sampable document distributions, i.e., efficiently computable randomized functions. looking image postings to social media services (e.g., Instagram or Weibo). Because censorship authorities may infiltrate among the activist's followers, the ability of broadcast steganography to authorize/deauthorize recipients at a fine grain would enable the blogger to revoke the infiltrator and prevent him from recovering the hiddentext, without him noticing that he has been singled out.
Our Contributions. This work initiates the study of broadcast steganography. After introducing a suitable security framework, we highlight the connections with the issue of recipient-anonymity in broadcast encryption. One of our main technical contributions is the introduction of a new variant of anonymous broadcast encryption that we term outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts. Our oABE$ construction achieves sublinear ciphertext size and is secure in the standard model against adaptive adversaries, which required circumventing multiple technical hurdles and is thus of independent interest. Finally, we devise efficient oABE$-based BS schemes at varying security levels (cf. Table 2) , including a construction with sublinear stegotexts secure in the standard model against adaptive adversaries.
Background
Documents & Covertexts. Let Σ = {0, 1} σ be a finite set of bit-strings with length σ. Denote by Σ * the set of sequences of finite length over Σ. We call the strings u ∈ Σ documents and the strings s ∈ Σ * covertexts.
Channels.
A channel C h is a function that takes as input a channel history h ∈ Σ * and produces a probability distribution on Σ.
, where H ∞ is the min-entropy function. A channel can be modeled either as an oracle or as an efficiently computable randomized function Channel(h; r) (where r denotes the random coins). While the latter is a stronger assumption on the channel, [27] shows to be necessary for secure steganography. Efficiently computable channels also enable broadcast steganographic constructions with stronger security guarantees (cf. Sect. 5).
Public-Key Steganography. From an operational standpoint, public-key steganography resembles the setting of asymmetric encryption: a participant with a public/secret key pair is able to receive covert messages (the hiddentexts) from another party, who only knows the public key. Unlike the case of public-key cryptography, however, the encoded hiddentexts, termed stegotexts, are required to be indistinguishable from the covertexts of the communication channel.
A common approach to realize public-key stegosystems is the "encrypt-then-embed" paradigm [4, 27, 28, 43] , depicted in Fig. 2 . At a high level, encoding is accomplished by first encrypting the hiddentext using a public-key cryptosystem, and then implanting the resulting ciphertext in the stegotext using an embedding function. The decoding process develops similarly, but in the reverse direction. Based on the security properties of the underlying cryptosystem and embedding function, one obtains stegosystems with a variety of security guarantees (cf. Sect. 1).
Outsider-Anonymous Broadcast Encryption (oABE).
The notion of private broadcast encryption was initially introduced in [5] , with the aim of providing explicit protection for identities of the receivers during each transmission. As a proof-of-concept, therein the authors suggested both generic and number-theoretic public-key constructions that do not leak any information about the list of authorized receivers, and are secure in the standard model and in the random oracle model, respectively. The proposed schemes, however, have communication complexity linear in the number of recipients. In [35] , Libert et al. suggested proof techniques to argue the security of (a variant of) the number-theoretic construction of [5] without reliance on random oracles, thus attaining anonymous broadcast encryption with efficient decryption in the standard model. Still, ciphertexts in the resulting construction have length linear in the number of recipients. In [33] , Kiayias and Samari put forth lower bounds on the ciphertext size of private broadcast encryption schemes and showed, among other results, that fully anonymous broadcast encryption schemes with a certain "atomicity" property (satisfied, e.g., by the schemes of [5, 35] ) must have (s · λ) ciphertext size, where s is the number of authorized receivers and λ is the security parameter.
Fazio and Perera [19] formalized the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption, which lies between the complete lack of protection that characterizes traditional broadcast encryption schemes as introduced in [21] , and the full anonymity provided by [5, 35] . In an oABE scheme, an attacker who intercepts a ciphertext of which she is not a legal recipient will be unable to learn anything about the identities of the legal recipients (let alone the contents of the ciphertext). Still, for those ciphertexts for which the adversary is in the authorized set of recipients, she might also garner information about the identities of the other receivers. This seems a natural relaxation, since often the contents of the communication already reveals something about the recipient set. Moreover, it enables schemes that achieve sublinear ciphertexts size and are secure against adaptive adversaries in the standard model. We observe that, in light of the lower bounds of [33] , the trade-off proposed in [19] may be unavoidable.
Entropy Smoothing Hash. A family of hash functions H es = {H : X → Y } is "entropy smoothing" [29] if it is hard to distinguish (H, H(x)) from (H, y), where H is a random element of H es , x is a random element of X, and y is a random element of Y . More formally, H es is called (t, )-entropy smoothing if for every t-time adversary A,
where the probability is over the choice of H, x, y and over the random coins used by A. Given the master public key MPK, a secret key sk i , and a stegotext s ∈ Σ * , Decode either outputs a message m ∈ MSP or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Decode is deterministic.
Correctness. For every S ⊆ U , every i ∈ S, every legal channel history h ∈ Σ * , and every m ∈ MSP, if (MPK, MSK) is output by Setup(1 λ , N ) and sk i is generated by KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i), then Decode(MPK, sk i , Encode(MPK, S, h, m)) = m except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦ Remark 3.1. In contrast to the definition from [27] , our definition requires that the Decode algorithm works without receiving the channel history h corresponding to the stegotext s as an input. This is crucial for an efficient broadcast steganography scheme, because requiring that authorized users feed the Decode algorithm with the same h that was used by the sender entails a level of coordination that is unrealistic in a broadcast setting. Our definition also applies to channels whose samples do not depend on h at all, as Encode may simply ignore h.
The Security Models
In broadcast encryption (BE), the adversary's goal is to learn something about the message encrypted within a given ciphertext despite not having a valid decryption key. In broadcast steganography, the adversary's goal is to detect the presence of a message in a given covertext without a valid decoding key. In either case, one may consider multiple levels of security, according to the amount of power afforded to the attacker. We discuss below three models of security for broadcast steganography schemes, followed by formal definitions later in this section.
Chosen-Hiddentext Attack (BS-CHA).
This is the weakest model of security for a broadcast steganography scheme. Analogous to the chosen-plaintext attack in broadcast encryption, the adversary in this context is only allowed to corrupt users by gaining their secret keys.
Publicly-Detectable Replayable Chosen-Covertext Attack (BS-PDR-CCA).
In this model of security, the adversary is additionally given access to a decoding oracle through which they can obtain the hiddentext (if any) in any covertext s of their choice, as recovered by any honest user i of their choice, subject to the following restriction: After receiving the challenge covertext s * for the set of recipients S * , the adversary is not allowed to query the decoding oracle with a user index i and a covertext s such that i ∈ S * and s ≡ MPK s * , where ≡ MPK is an arbitrary compatible relation: 
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ.
2. There exists a PPT algorithm that takes MPK, s 1 , s 2 and determines whether s 1 ≡ MPK s 2 . ♦
Chosen-Covertext Attack (BS-CCA).
A BS-CCA adversary has the same capabilities from the BS-PDR-CCA model of security, but the restriction for the decoding queries is now lifted. Specifically, the only covertext that the adversary is not allowed to submit to the decoding oracle with a user index i ∈ S * is the challenge covertext s * itself.
We now formally define the BS-CCA security model via the following security game.
Definition 3.3:
For a given BS scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encode, Decode), the BS-IND-CCA game, played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows:
and gives A the resulting master public key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set of revoked users R to be empty.
Phase 1:
A adaptively issues queries q 1 , . . . , q m of one of the following types:
• Secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of a user i ∈ U . C runs sk i ← KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i), adds i to R, and sends sk i to A.
• Decoding query (i, s): A issues a decoding query on a user index i ∈ U and a covertext s ∈ Σ * . First, C computes sk i ← KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i). Then, it runs Decode(MPK, sk i , s) and gives the result to A.
Challenge: A gives C a message m * ∈ MSP, a legal history h ∈ Σ * , and a set of user identities S * ⊆ U with the restriction that S * ∩ R = ∅. C picks a random bit b * ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge s * depending on it as follows. If b * = 0, then C encodes m * into a stegotext s * for the receiver set S * , i.e., s * ← Encode(MPK, S * , h, m * ). Otherwise, C sample s * as a covertext of equal length, i.e., s * ←$ C l * h for l * = |Encode(MPK, S * , h, m * )|/σ. At the end, C gives s * to A.
Phase 2:
A adaptively issues additional queries q m+1 , . . . , q n where each q i is one of the following:
• Secret-key query i such that i ∈ S * .
• Decoding query (i, s) such that, if i ∈ S * , then s = s * . The BS-IND-CHA game is defined similar to the BS-IND-CCA game, with the restriction that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decoding queries during Phase 1 and Phase 2. The adversary is still allowed to issue secret-key queries.
Guess

Definition 3.6:
A BS scheme Π is (t, Q sk , )-BS-CHA-secure if Π is (t, Q sk , 0, )-BS-CCA-secure.♦
Anonymity and Pseudorandomness in Broadcast Encryption
In Sect. 2, we briefly discussed the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption [19] , a security model for BE whose goal is to hide the identities of the intended receivers of a broadcast ciphertext from unauthorized users. As outlined in Sect. 1, a crucial technical step to realize broadcast steganography is combining receiver anonymity with pseudorandomness of broadcast ciphertexts (cf. Sect. 5). This section develops the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts (oABE$), and presents an efficient oABE$ construction secure in the standard model under a stronger security model, outsider anonymity and ciphertext pseudorandomness against chosen-ciphertext attacks (oABE$-CCA).
The Security Models of oABE$
We now present three oABE$ security models: oABE$-CPA, oABE$-PDR-CCA, and oABE$-CCA. In Sect. 4.2, we present an oABE$-CCA-secure construction. At a high level, these security models require that for any message m * and set of recipients S * , no PPT adversary A can distinguish between an actual encryption of m * intended for the set S * , and a truly random string of the same length as an encryption of m * for S * , so long as A does not possess the secret key of any user in S * . Definition 4.1: For a given oABE$ scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt), the oABE$-IND-CCA game, played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows: N ) and gives A the resulting master public key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set of revoked users R to be empty.
Phase 1:
A adaptively issues queries q 1 , . . . , q m where each q i is one of the following:
• Decryption query (i, c): A issues a decryption query on a user i ∈ U and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP. C computes sk i ← KeyGen(MPK, MSK, i), runs Decrypt(MPK, sk i , c), and gives the result to A.
Challenge: A gives C a message m * ∈ MSP and a set of user identities S * ⊆ U with the restriction that S * ∩ R = ∅. C picks a random bit b * ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext c * depending on it:
The challenge ciphertext c * is then given to A.
Phase 2:
• Decryption query (i, c) such that, if i ∈ S * , then c = c * .
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b * .
The adversary A is called an oABE$-IND-CCA adversary and A's advantage is defined as
where the probability is over the random coins used by the adversary A and the challenger C. ♦
Observe that the key difference of the above definition from the oABE notion defined in [19] is in the Challenge phase, where the challenger either returns the encryption of m * or a random bit-string with appropriate length. 
An oABE$-CCA-Secure Construction
Our construction builds on the one of [19] , so we start with a brief review of the latter. At a high level, the approach of [19] is to: (1) "bundle" multiple ciphertexts of an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme (AIBE, e.g., [1, 10, 23] ) into a single oABE ciphertext; (2) "tag" each AIBE ciphertext to enable the decryptor to efficiently locate the component compatible with her decryption key; and (3) "seal" everything together with a one-time signature to thwart CCA attacks. To attain pseudorandom oABE ciphertexts, we will start with an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts (AIBE$) like the one of [2] . Additionally, we will use an entropy-smoothing hash function [29] to hide the structure in the ciphertext tags. These adjustments do not suffice, however, because the presence of the one-time signature introduces additional structure in the oABE ciphertext of [19] . To get around this, we substitute one-time signatures with MACs (implemented via pseudorandom functions) and employ a variant of an encapsulation mechanism [8, 18] with an additional pseudorandom property. In short, an encapsulation mechanism is a "relaxed" commitment scheme consisting of a triplet of algorithms (SetupCom, Commit, Open): SetupCom(1 λ ) produces a commitment public key PK ; Commit(PK ) samples a random bitstringk together with associated commitment and decommitment information com and decom; and Open(PK , com, decom) recoversk. For hiding, triples of the form (PK , com,k) ought to be statistically indistinguishable from those of the form (PK , com, r) for random r. For relaxed binding, given a random output (k, com, decom) of Commit(PK ), it should be hard to produce decom such that Open(PK , com, decom ) ∈ {k, ⊥}.
Let p, q be primes such that 2 λ < q < 2 λ+1 and p = 2q + 1, and g be a square modulo p. Denote by G = g the group of quadratic residues modulo p. To "pack" quadratic residues into λ bits, we will use rejection sampling along with the following well-known G-Z q bijection (cf. e.g., [27] ): 
Fam -the set of all the subtrees in T 4 for j := 1 to |Fam| do HID i -the HID of leaf i in T 2 for z := 1 to n + 1 do
Cov -the subtrees covering S in T 7 for j := 1 to |Cov| do 8 T j -a subtree in Cov
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HID j -the HID of T j 's root [39] encapsulation mechanism over G, whose commitment public keys are random pairs (g com , h com ) of generators of G. The hiding requirement follows from the hiding properties of standard Pedersen commitments, coupled with the observation that mp(·) is a bijection. Relaxed binding follows from the discrete logarithm assumption in G, again similarly to standard Pedersen commitments. A novel feature of our encapsulation mechanism is that the distribution of commitments com induced by the Commit(PK ) algorithm is uniform over {0, 1} λ , and hence the relaxed commitment scheme of Fig. 3 has pseudorandom commitments.
Let Π = (Init, Ext, Enc, Dec) be an AIBE$-CCA-secure AIBE$ scheme with expansion (i.e., |Enc(MPK , ID, m)| = (|m|)). Let F : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ be a PRF and let H es = {G 2 → {0, 1} λ } be an entropy smoothing hash function family. Below we describe at a high level how we combine these primitives into an oABE$-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt); Fig. 4 reports the details.
To attain sublinear ciphertexts, we follow the approach of [19] , which is based on the Subset Cover Framework [14, 38] (cf. also App. A). We arrange the N = 2 n users in a perfect binary tree with N leaves, and assign to each user (using AIBE$) n + 1 decryption keys, corresponding to all the nodes in the path to its designated leaf (Line 4 of KeyGen). Each oABE$ ciphertexts consists of multiple AIBE$ components, shuffled in random order (Lines 1, 11, and 14 of Encrypt). For efficient decryption, AIBE$ components are tagged using a twin-DH-based [12] technique reminiscent of [20, 35] (Line 10 of Encrypt), so that recipients can single out which AIBE$ component to decrypt, and with which key (Lines 5-8 and 9 of Decrypt). Throughout Encrypt, we make sure that each piece in a oABE$ ciphertext looks random, with the use of rejection sampling (Lines 3-5), entropy smoothing (Line 10), dummy components (Line 13), and pseudorandom MACs (Line 15) in place of one-time signature. Forgoing signatures introduce a complication, as the input to the PRF appears to depend on the PRF keyk: the c j values and the oABE$ components c j 's computed in Lines 10 and 11 are derived from com and decom, which correlate withk. We solve this circularity by mediating the occurrence ofk in the ciphertext via the encapsulation scheme of Fig. 3 (cf. App. B for more details). F is a (t 1 , 1 H es is a (t 3 , 3 ) -entropy smoothing hash function, and DDH is (t 4 , 4 )-hard in G, then the construction given in Fig. 4 is
Theorem 4.5 (Proof in App. B): If
)-hard PRF, Π is (t 2 , Q sk , Q d , 2 )-AIBE$- CCA-secure,t 1 + t 2 + t 3 + t 4 , Q sk , Q d , 1 + 2 + 3 + 2 4 + Q d q r log N r - oABE$-CCA-secure.
Constructions of Public-Key Broadcast Steganography
We now present three constructions of broadcast steganography: one for each model of security defined in Sect. 3.2. Our constructions employ the encrypt-then-embed paradigm depicted in Fig. 2 , using oABE$ (Sect. 4) for encryption and rejection-sampling [3, 28, 43] for embedding. In what follows, s σ i denotes the i th leftmost non-overlapping substring with length σ of a given bit-string s.
A BS-CHA-Secure Construction
The rejection-sampler function used in our first construction is given in Fig. 5a . Sample takes as input a security parameter λ, a channel history h ∈ Σ * , a function H : Σ → {0, 1}, and a Algorithm: bit-string c ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a covertext s ∈ Σ * . Internally, for every bit c i , Sample attempts to find a covertext s σ i ∈ Σ such that H(s σ i ) = c i by repeatedly querying the channel oracle up to λ number of times. 3 This mechanism allows a simple method to extract c from s:
where l = |s|/σ. As shown in [4, 43] , if the channel is always informative, H is a strongly universal hash function, and c is uniformly random, then the maximum statistical distance between s 1 ← Sample(λ, h, H, c) and s 2 ← C |c| h for any valid h ∈ Σ * is negligible in the security parameter λ. For simplicity, we denote this statistical distance when |c| = 1 by 1 in the reminder of the paper.
We obtain our BS-CHA-secure scheme by combining the rejection-sampler function from Fig. 5a with our oABE$ scheme (cf. Sect. 4). Formally, given a strongly universal hash function family H su = {H : Σ → {0, 1}} and an oABE$-CPA-secure oABE$ scheme Π = (Setup , KeyGen , Encrypt , Decrypt ) with expansion (i.e., |Encrypt (MPK , S, m)| = (|m|)), we construct a BS-CHA-secure broadcast steganography scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encode, Decode) as shown in Fig. 6 . Remark 5.1. If the oABE$ scheme employed in Fig. 6 is oABE$-PDR-CCA-secure, then the resulting broadcast steganography scheme is BS-PDR-CCA-secure.
A BS-CCA-Secure Construction
Unfortunately, our first construction fails to provide a BS-CCA-secure broadcast steganography scheme even if the oABE$ scheme internally used provides oABE$-CCA security. The problem is that the rejection-sampler function from Fig. 5a allows multiple covertexts corresponding to a given bit-string. However, this limitation can be overcome in the case of channels that are efficiently computable and whose samples are independently distributed. In fact, for channels of this type, Hopper [26] devised a deterministic rejection-sampler function DSample that maps a given bit-string to exactly one covertext.
As shown in Fig. 5b , DSample takes in input a security parameter λ, a predicate H : Σ → {0, 1} along with a bit-string c ∈ {0, 1} * to embed, and a random bit-string r ∈ {0, 1} |c|·λ 2 that controls the embedding. To sample s ∈ Σ * , for every bit c i of c, DSample seeks s σ i ∈ Σ such that H(s σ i ) = c i , by repeatedly drawing from the channel according to the random chunks specified in r. This approach requires that the channel be efficiently computable by a function Channel(·) whose samples are independent of the history (hence we drop h from its input), but guarantees that an adversary who intercepts a stegotext is unable to tweak it meaningfully. Furthermore, as shown in [4, 27, 43] , if H is a strongly universal hash function, and c and r are uniformly random, then the statistical distance between stegotexts produced by DSample and innocent covertexts sampled from Channel(·) is a negligible function 1 of λ. Figure 7 reports the details of our BS-IND-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encode, Decode), based on a strongly universal hash function family H su , a variable-length pseudorandom generator (vPRG) G : {0, 1} λ × Z → {0, 1} * (whose second input sets the output length), and an oABE$-IND-CCA-secure scheme Π = (Setup , KeyGen , Encrypt , Decrypt ) with expansion . Fig. 7 is (t 2 + t 3 , Q sk , Q d , µ 1 + 2 + 3 )-BS-CCA-secure, where µ is the polynomial bound on the total message length.
Theorem 5.2 (Proof in App. D): If the channel is always informative, H su is a strongly universal hash function family, G is a (t 2 , 2 )-hard vPRG, and Π is
(t 3 , Q sk , Q d , 3 )-oABE$-CCA-secure, then the construction in
Extensions and Future Work
As in the case of broadcast encryption, one may consider extensions of the notion of broadcast steganography that enhance the setting discussed in this paper with additional functionality or security properties. In particular, while broadcast steganography natively protects the recipients' identities from outsiders, it does not aim to prevent recipients from finding out about each other. The natural solution for that is anonymous broadcast steganography (AnoBS). By extending the anonymous broadcast encryption schemes of [5, 35] to support ciphertext pseudorandomness, we can use them in place of our oABE$ to achieve fully anonymous broadcast steganography. The resulting AnoBS scheme, however, would have ciphertexts with length linear in the number of receivers. We defer the details of the AnoBS security model and of the above construction to the full version. 
A Review of the Subset Cover Framework
The subset cover (SC) framework proposed by Naor et al. [38] is a system that abstracts a variety of revocation schemes in the private-key setting where only the Center can broadcast. In a nutshell, a revocation scheme belonging to the SC framework defines a collection of subsets S of the universe of users U = [1, N ] in the system. During the key generation phase, the Center assigns to each subset S i ∈ S a long-lived key k i , which is also given to each user belonging to S i . When the Center wants to broadcast a message m, it generates a short-lived session key k, determines the set of revoked users R, finds a set of disjoint subsets S from S that contains or "covers" all the users in U \R, encrypts k using the long-lived keys corresponding to the subsets in S, and finally broadcasts the encryption of m under k and the encryptions of k to all the users in the system. Upon receiving a broadcast ciphertext, a user can decrypt successfully and obtain m if and only if that user is part of the authorized set (i.e., the user possesses a long-lived key corresponding to some subset of S). The authors in [38] also presented two concrete revocation schemes, namely the complete subtree (CS) method and the subset difference (SD) method. In the CS method, which is the simplest of the two, the ciphertext length is O r log N r and the secret key length at a receiver is O log N , where r is the number of revoked users. In the SD method, the one with more involved computations, the ciphertext length reduces to O r while the secret key length increases to O log 2 N . Another crucial difference between the two schemes is that the assignment of the long-lived keys in the former is information-theoretic, whereas in the latter its computational. Below we provide a short description of the CS method, and we refer the reader to [38] for further details on the SD method.
Complete Subtree Method. In this scheme, the N users are represented as the leaves of a perfect binary tree T and the collection of subsets S contains all possible subtrees of T . In case N is not a power of 2, some dummy users are added to the system. During the key generation phase, every subtree in S is assigned a long-lived secret key which is also made available to all the users belonging to that subtree. Since every user is a member of all the subtrees rooted at each node in the path from the root of T down to the leaf corresponding to that user, the secret key length at a user is O log N . The ciphertext length becomes O r log N r due to the fact that it requires on average a logarithmic number of subtrees to revoke r users (see [38] for a formal analysis).
Extension of the SC Framework to the Public-Key Setting. The original SC framework was defined in the private-key setting. In [14] , Dodis and Fazio extended the SC framework to the public-key setting by combining a novel assignment of hierarchical identifiers (HIDs) to the nodes in T with (hierarchical) identity-based encryption ((H)IBE). For completeness, we only explain below the extension of the CS method. We refer to [14] for the specifics regarding the SD method.
The assignment of HIDs to the nodes in T goes as follows. First, the root of T is assigned a special identifier denoted by ε. Next, each edge e of T is assigned the identifier ID e ∈ {0, 1} depending on whether the edge connects to the left child or to the right child. Then, the hierarchical identifier HID v of any node v can be computed by concatenating all the identifiers starting from the root of T down to v (i.e., HID v := ε ID e 1 . . . ID e log N ). It is important to note that any prefix of HID v represents a valid HID of an ancestor of v.
Once the HIDs of the nodes are assigned, the authors employ an IBE scheme in order to encrypt the short-lived session keys during broadcasts. The long-lived keys of the subsets in S now become the IBE keys corresponding to the HIDs of the nodes in T . Since the structure of the T and the assignment of HIDs are publicly known to all the users, any user in the system can be a sender as well as a receiver. In the public-key setting, the Center becomes the trusted authority that provides each user with the required IBE keys.
B Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games (Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 1 , . . . , Game l , Game l ) between an oABE$-IND-CCA adversary A and the challenger C, where l denotes the cardinality of the coverset Cov induced by the set of authorized receivers S * chosen by A during the Challenge phase of the oABE$-IND-CCA game. In the first game (Game 0 ), A receives an encryption of m * for S * in the Challenge phase, and in the last game (Game l ), A receives a uniformly random bit-string of the appropriate length as the challenge ciphertext.
Game 0 : corresponds to the game given in Definition 4.1 when the challenge bit b * is fixed to 0.
The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Guess follows exactly as specified in Definition 4.1. During the Challenge phase, A gives C a message m * ∈ MSP and a set of user identities S * ⊆ U with the restriction that S * ∩ R = ∅, where R is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which is subsequently sent to A, as follows: 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that internally runs the oABE$-IND-CCA game with the adversary A in order to gain advantage in the AIBE$-IND-CCA game with the challenger C . We denote the secret-key oracle and the decryption oracle of C by O sk (·) and O d (·, ·) respectively. After receiving the master public key MPK of the AIBE$ scheme from C , B executes the oABE$-IND-CCA game with A as follows:
Setup: B generate MPK, which he eventually sends to A, by executing lines 2-10 of the Setup algorithm of Fig. 4 . B also keeps the exponents {a i,HID j , b i,HID j } i∈{1,2},j∈ [1, |Fam|] to himself and initializes the set of revoked users R to be empty. Finally, B computes the challenge ciphertext c * , which is eventually sent to A, as follows:
• If c = c * and i ∈ S * , then B proceeds as in Phase 1.
• If c = c * and i ∈ S * , then B computes HID i and proceeds as follows:
If for all z = 1 to n + 1, it is the case that HID i|z = HID l−h+1 , then B proceeds as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition ∀z ∈ [1, n + 1] : HID i|z = HID l−h+1 ensures that the decryption query that B will make to its challenger C in the process of responding to A's query is allowed. If ∃ z ∈ [1, n + 1] such that HID i|z = HID l−h+1 , and c does not appear among the ciphertext components of c, then again B proceeds as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition that c does not contain c ensures that also in this case the decryption query that B will make to its challenger C in the process of responding to A's query is allowed.
, but c appears among the ciphertext components of c, then B outputs ⊥. Arguing that this (i.e., ⊥) is the real reply that A would get in either Game h or Game h requires some care, but can be done along the lines of the proofs of [8] and [18] . In a nutshell, the issue is the circularity in the PRF usage: in generating the σ component of the ciphertext, F (k, ·) is computed overĉ, which includes ciphertext components that contain com and decom, which in turn correlate withk. The reason this circularity does not break the argument is that the appearance ofk into the ciphertext is mediated by the relaxed commitment scheme.
In particular, since com is included both in the clear and inside each ciphertext component (which are individually AIBE-CCA-secure as part of c * ), and since the decryption algorithm checks that they be consistent, the adversary is forced to keep in the outer layer of her query ciphertext c the same value of com that was in the challenge c * , or decryption would fail. Now for that value of com, by the relaxed binding property, the only valid PRF key that can be decommitted isk. At this point the argument would seem to get stuck again, as it is not apparent how to guarantee that the adversary does not learn enough aboutk from the several ciphertext components in c * so as to be able to compute F -values under that key.
As it turns out, this point can also be tamed through a separate sequence-of-games analysis [8] . It then follows that the adversary will not be able to compute the proper σ for the ciphertext she was trying to craft, which finally fully justifies the ⊥ reply by the simulator. We defer the details for the full version.
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B passes this bit as his guess for b to C .
Observe that, by construction, it holds that if C chooses b = 0, then B is playing Game h−1 , whereas if b = 1, then B is playing Game h . Therefore, the PRF and the AIBE$-IND-CCA advantage of B is essentially A's advantage in distinguishing Game h−1 from Game h : A 2,HID l−h+1 ) s with another random group element r 1 ∈ G during the transition from Game 1,h to Game 2,h . Finally, during the transition from Game 2,h to Game h we replace H(r 1 , r 2 ) with a truly random bit-string of length λ.
The idea of the proof of the first two transitions is to reduce from the DDH problem and build a PPT adversary B that internally executes the oABE$-IND-CCA game with the adversary A in order to gain advantage in breaking the DDH assumption. This reduction argument proceeds along the same lines as Lemma 1 of [35] . As for the second transition, we employ the fact that H es is an entropy smoothing hash function. We defer the details to the full version.
C Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. We organize the proof as a sequence of games (Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 2 ) between a BS-IND-CHA adversary A and a challenger C. During the Challenge phase in Game 0 , A is given a stegotext for m * under S * , whereas in Game 2 , A is given a covertext consisting of some samples from the channel oracle.
Game 0 : is the actual BS-IND-CHA game when the challenge bit b * is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Guess follows as specified in Definition 3.3. During the Challenge phase, A sends C a message m * ∈ MSP, a legal history h ∈ Σ * , and a set of user identities S * ⊆ U with the restriction that S * ∩ R = ∅. Next, C generates the challenge stegotext s * , which is later sent to A, as follows:
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, let Adv i A,Π denote A's advantage of winning Game i . Since Π is (t 2 , Q sk , 2 )-oABE$-CPA-secure, it follows from a straightforward reduction argument that A's advantage in distinguishing Game 0 from Game 1 is at most 2 (i.e., Adv 0 A,Π − Adv 1 A,Π ≤ 2 ). Once we bound the total message length by the polynomial µ, it follows from another simple reduction argument that A's advantage in distinguishing Game 1 from Game 2 is at most µ 1 (i.e., Adv 
